As a rule, out-of-role behavior is thought to have greater credibility than ln-roIe behavior in the sense that the former IS more informative about real behefs than the latter Thus even the simple-heart, seeking a reliable gmde to another's true feehngs and being aware of the social obligations under which this person labors, will discount behavior consistent with these obhgations and pay special attention to behavior inconsistent with the same The theoretical explanation is straightforward (Heider, 1958 , Jones & Davis, 1965 , Kelley, 1967 In order to evaluate the credibihty of an action the observer first must decide whether the action is internally determined ("he said X because he beheves X is true") or extemally determined ("he said X IS true because his position obhges him to say X is true") When both classes of determinants provide a reasonable explanation for the action (in-role behavior) each is given less weight than when only one offers a reasonable accountmg (out-of-role behavior) Thus, if the act is m hne with one's role obligations then both extemal and intemal causation are plausible, if, however, the act IS out of line, only the latter is plausible It follows then that out-of-role behavior is more credible than m-role behavior because the former is more likely than the latter to be attnbuted solely to intemal causes From a different theoretical stance Skinner and others make a similar distinction between tacts or behavior under the control of discriminative
stimuh (eg, statements which the person believes are accurate descnptions of the world) and mands or behavior under the control of reinforcing stimuli (eg, statements which the person believes will have profitable consequences)
The present study explores two aspects of the attribution of credibihty The first has to do with the observer's prior belief about the behavior Does out-of-role behavior seem more credible than m-role behavior regardless of how much more unthinkable or repugnant the former is than the latter-* The second involves the generalization of credibility Does the credibihty attnbuted to out-of-role behavior spread to other acts which are role-neutral, being neither prescribed nor proscribed by the role m question^* Attribution phenomena are often descnbed in the language of inferential statistics (eg, Kelley, 1967 Kelley, , 1973 This inadvertently suggests scmpulous objectivity on the part of the observer Few researchers, however, will take the suggestion seriously because there are well known and fairly compelling reasons for expecting observers with different behefs to draw rather different conclusions from the identical behavior Research on prestige suggestion (Asch, Block, & Hertzman, 1938 , Lewis, 1941 li perhaps the classical demonstration that the credibility of an assertion depends not only on its ln-role/outof-role character but also on the observer's beliefs about the person doing the asserting The cognitive consistency literature leads one to expect similar kinds of effects For instance, Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) contend that if an observer has a strong belief about how a certain actor should behave and this behef is disconfirmed, say, by information that the actor has engaged in out-of-role behavior, the observer will senously doubt this information Attnbution theorists with a Rayesian and/or information processing bent probably would agree that pnor beliefs are important For instance, they might conjecture that the amount of information required to make a stable inference about another depends on prior behefs (see Ajzen, 1971 , Kelley, 1973 , and Trope, 1974 Thus their prediction could well be that if the actor's behavior disconfirms a strongly held belief, the observer will make only tentative inferences or entirely suspend judgment until he obtains additional information, if, however.
his prior belief about the actor was weak (or, of course, congruent with the behavior), the observer will have no need for nor will he seek much additional information In fact. Barefoot and Straub (1971) and Girodo (1973) have tested some of these speculations, but only in the context of self-attribution
The attnbution process is in part one of generahzation whereby behaviors are perceived as similar because they often share certain critical features, e g, they occur together in close sequence, they mamfest the identical intention, they are emitted by the same person, they are directed to the same person, etc As a result the observer is able to transform complex and vanable information about the contingencies of action into concise, stable representations of the actor's personality Many would assume such a process is functional and pervasive If so, the tendency to generalize from one behavior to another may be strong, perhaps automatic On the other hand, generalization phenomena such as the "halo effect" diminish when the actions being evaluated are clearly expressed and substantially different (eg, see Rommetveit, 1960) , and, of course, when comparmg m-role or out-of-role acts with those which are role-neutral, there IS another distinguishing feature-the former behaviors are closely tied to the actor's role, the latter are not All m all then, the spread of credibihty to role-neutral acts is an open issue It IS simply unclear under what conditions observers who believe a person has behaved frankly, mdependently, etc, m one domain will attribute similar charactenstics to his behavior m another domain
The present study contains two very similar expenments They differ mainly in respect to the actors, the latter being chosen so that what is m-role (or out-of-role) for one is outof-role (or m-role) for the other (see Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961) Prior to observing the actor individuals indicate their belief that he is likely to hold particular attitudes They then have an opportunity to hear the actor discuss issues which are relevant to these attitudes Following this, individuals mdicate the extent to which they (1) perceive the m-role or out-of-role character of the behavior, (2) take the actor's pronouncements as credible, as reflecting his own behefs, and (3) revise their prior behefs about the actor in the hght of his actions EXPERIMENT I
Method
Subjects One hundred twenty male undergraduates at the University of Michigan were recruited for this expenment from a volunteer subject pool and paid at the rate of $2 00 per hour The expenment itself lasted about 45 mmutes Procedure Subjects were told they were to be observers-a label which we will use hereafter-m a study of social judgment They leamed they would listen to an interview and then make certain judgments about the person (actor) bemg interviewed The latter, with an obviously Jewish name, was said to have recently graduated from the School of Education at a nearby umversity where he was active in the Hillel organization and in other Jewish student groups. He was now applymg for a job at an excellent pnvate Jewish school The job involved teaching current events and modem Jewish history The tape the observers would hear was said to be part of a job interview between our applicant and the headmaster of the school After the actor and the interview setting were descnbed, observers filled out a short questiomiaire On a seven-point scale they mdicated their attitudes toward Israel (extremely pro-Israeli = 1, extremely anti-Israeh = 7), the Common Market (extremely pro-Common Market = 1, extremely anti-Common Market = 7), and strategic arms limitation (extremely pro-arms limitation = 1, extremely anti-arms limitation =7) Fmally they were asked m the light of the mformation received about the actor to estimate the likelihood that he is m fact really pro-Israeli, pro-Common Market, and pro-arms hmitation Each of the latter estimates were made on 20-pomt scales (e g, I am certam he IS really pro-Israeli = 1, I am certam he is really not proIsraeh = 20) » Observers were then played one of two versions of the taped mterview m which they heard the actor respond to questions about his views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Common Market, and strategic arms limitation In the tn-rcHe version observers heard the actor consistently make strong positive statements about Israeh j[K)hcies, m the out-of-role version he consistently made strong negative statements about these pobcies Identical evaluations of the Common Market and arms limitation were made by the actor in both the m-role and out-of-role conditions These consisted of moderately positive to highly positive statements * The issues were discussed dunng the interview m the same order under both conditions the Common Market, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and finally, strategic arms limitation At the conclusion of the taped interview all observers responded to a second questionnaire The statements made about the three issues were rated separately (eg, "I thmk the statements made by Mr Cohen about the Common Market were ") on seven pomt scales anchored by the followmg pairs of adjectives Loyal (l)-Disloyal (7), Independent (l)-Conformmg (7), Sincere (l)-Insmcere (7), and Frank (l)-Deceptive (7) The first two pairs assessed the observer's perception of the m-role/out-of-role character of the three sets of statements, the remainmg two pairs measured their perceived credibility Observers always rated the Common Market statements first, statements about the Arab-Israeh conflict second, and the arms limitation statements third Observers then were asked to consider the actor "as a person what he is hke in general" and to rate him on the same set of traits The next part of the questioimaire was essentially a repetition of the pre-interview hkehhood estimate, that IS, observers estimated the hkehhood of the actor bemg pro-Israeh or anti-Israeh, pro-Common Market or anti-Common Market, etc, in the hght of what he said dunng the mterview A final Item had observers rate the extent to which they would have hked to have been given more information on what " Cohen IS hke and how he felt about the mterview " before makmg their judgment This was done on a seven-pomt scale (I would have hked more information = 1, I would not have hked more information = 7)
Results
The data in this and the following experiment were treated by means of analysis of variance Unless otherwise specified, the observer's attitude toward Israel and the actor's statements about Israel constitute main effects in the analyses Observers were divided into three groups according to their self-rated attitudes toward Israel Although there was an overall bias in favor of Israel, observers whose ratings fell m the upper quartile of the distnbution of ratmgs were considered proIsraeli, those m the lower quartile, anti-Israeli, and those in the middle half of the distribution, neutral.'4
The m-role and out-of-role transcnpts are available upon request 5 On seven-pomt scale (l=:very pro-Israeh, 7 =: very anti-Israeh), the pro-Israeli mean was 13, the neutral mean was 3 2 and the anti-Israeli mean was 5 1 There is good evidence that the ln-role/out-of-role distinction was clear to subjects Anti-Israeli (out-of-role) statements were considered to be more independent and disloyal than the proIsraeli (m-role) statements (see Table 1 ) The main effects for statements m both instances are quite reliable (PF < 005)
The traits of independence and disloyalty also were generalized to the actor "as a person," that is, he was considered a relatively independent and disloyal person after acting out-ofrole and a relatively conforming and loyal person after acting m-role (PF < 01) The observers' evaluations of statements about the Common Market and arms limitation were unaffected by the actor's comments on Israel
The credibility of ln-role and out-of-role acts may be inferred from observers' judgments of their smcenty and frankness The means for these ratings are given m Table 2 A significant main effect was obtained for observers (PF < 05) indicating that neutrals attnbuted only a moderate amount of smcenty to the actor's comments about Israel, while both the pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli observers attnbuted considerable smcenty to them A borderline Observer X Statements interaction (Pt < 10) suggests that the actor seemed more sincere behavmg ln- role than out-of-role for pro-Israeli observers A similar pattern appeared m ratings of frankness Observers tended to make httle distinction between in-role and out-of-role statements, those who were neutral judging both as moderately frank, while those who were pro-Israeli or anti-Israeh attnbutmg greater frankness to both sets of statements {PF < 05) When these three ratings are combined into an overall index of credibility (see Table 2 ) neutral observers assign less credibility to either kind of act than pro-Israeli or anti-Israeli observers {PF < 01) The ln-role actor "as a person" was seen as more frank than the out-of-role actor by pro-Israeh observers (M = 2 0 vs 3 7, respectively) while the reverse was the case for anti-Israeli observers (M = 40 vs 15, respectively) Neutrals made little differentiation m general frankness as a function of the actor's statements about Israel (M = 30 vs 2 5, respectively) The Observer X Statement interaction was quite reliable {PF < 01) A similar pattern, albeit nonsignificant, appeared for ratings of general sincerity Again neither the observer's attitude toward Israel nor the actor's statements in this regard had any noticeable effects on evaluations of the latter's pronouncements about the Common Market or arms limitation Analyses were then performed on the observer's estimate of the actor's true behefs Judgments made prior to hearing the interview indicated that pro-Israeli observers overestimated the likelihood of pro-Israeli attitudes (and underestimated the likelihood of anti-Israeli attitudes) compared to neutral and anti-Israeh observers (PF < 01) " In a separate analysis these prior likelihood estimates were compared with those made after heanng the interview (see Table 3 ) Following the interview observers believed it increasingly likely that the actor's attitudes corresponded to his statements about Israel {Pi-< 01) However, they revised their beliefs much more following out-of-role 6 Similar over-or underestimation are also obtamed in the second experiment Their discovery suggested the possibility that the various effects of observers' attitudes on credibility and bebef revision might be mediated by such 'biases' in judgment To determme if this was the case analyses of covanance were performed with the initial likelihood estimate as the covanate In no mstance did the pattem of results (mam effects or interactions) differ substantially from that based on the analyses of vanance presented m this and in our second experiment Thus, it can be concluded that the effects attnbuted to observers' attitudes were not mediated by differential tendencies to over-or underestimate the pnor likelihood of pro-or anti-Israel attitudes m the actors statements than following m-role statements ( PF < 001) and this revision tends to be more extensive among pro-Israeli and anti-Israeh observers than neutral observers {PF < 05) Small but reliable revisions occurred on hkehhood estimates of attitudes toward the Common Market and arms limitation ( PF < 01 and PF < 05, respectively) Revisions were always in the direction of the statements about these issues but did not vary with the in-role/out-of-role variables Finally an analysis was made of how much the observer desired further information about the situation and the actor Those who were faced with out-of-role behavior indicated a much stronger desire for additional information than those who dealt with ln-role behavior (Pp< 01) A near significant interaction (Pf < 10) suggests that pro-Israeli observers were especially m need of additional information after confronting an out-of-role actor EXPERIMENT 
II

Method
Subjects As m the first experiment all 120 male undergraduates were recruited from a volunteer pool and paid $2 00 per hour Procedure The procedure and matenals were identical to that of the first expenment m every respect except that the actor was presented to observers as an Arab who was bom and raised m the NearEast and sent to the U S for his umversity training He recently graduated from the School of Education at a nearby university where he was active m the Arab Student Association as well as m other Arab groups Before retummg to the Near-East he wanted to get some teachmg expenence and to that end had applied for a job at an excellent pnvate school estabhshed by the embassies of several Arab countnes to serve their nationals stationed in the U S The job involved teachmg current events and modem Arab history The tape observers were to hear was said to be part of a job interview between the apphcant and the headmaster of the school The same tapes were used as previously, m this expenment, however, the one containing pro-Israeh statements is the out-of-role tape and the one containmg anti-Israeli statements, the in-role tape
Results
Observers were divided into pro-Israeh, neutral, and antiIsraeli groups according to cntena previously discussed Again a bias m favor of Israel was evident, similar m degree to that found in our earlier sample In-role behavior (anti-Israeli statements), was generally considered more loyal and conforming {PF < 01) than out-of-role behavior (pro-Israeh statements), as IS shown in Table 4 Similar results were obtained in ratings of the actor "as a person "
The Common Market and arms limitation statements were also rated for loyalty and conformity None of the effects approached an acceptable level of significance Neutral observers perceived out-of-role behavior as more sincere and frank than ln-role behavior while pro-Israeli as well as anti-Israeli observers perceived the former as less sincere and frank than the latter (see Table 5 ) The interaction effect on both ratings is reliable (PF < 05) In this case, then, neutral observers judge out-of-role behavior as more credible than lnrole behavior while pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli observers do just the reverse A somewhat similar pattem appears m ratings of the actor "as a person " In evaluating how sincere a person he IS, pro-Israeh and anti-Israeli observers attributed greater sincenty to the actor under ln-role conditions (M = 1 7 and 2 6, respectively) than under out-of-role conditions (M = 5 2 and 5 0, respectively) Neutral observers made little differentiation between the sincerity of the ln-role (M = 3 1) and that of the out-of-role (M = 2 8) actor "as a person" Furthermore, in judging general frankness, both pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli observers considered an in-role actor to be more frank "as a person" (M = 2 8 and 2 3, respectively) than an out-of-role actor (M = 4 9 and 4 7, respectively) while neutral observers judged the reverse to be true, an m-role actor being seen as less frank a person than an out-of-role actor (M = 3 3 and 2 6 respectively) These effects involving ratings of the actor "as a person" were significant at the 05 level or better Analyses of the ratings of the smcenty and frankness of the actors' statements regarding the Common Market and arms limitation demonstrate no reliable mam effects or interactions as a function of our independent vanables.
Analyses were then performed on the observer's estimate of the actor's true behefs pnor to hearing the interview Compared to anti-Israeli and neutral observers, pro-Israeli observers underestimated {PF < 05) the hkehhood of pro-Israeli attitudes (or overestimated the likelihood of anti-Israeli attitudes) In a separate analysis these prior likelihood estimates were compared with those made following the interview presentation The companson reveals a highly significant overall revision {PF < 001) The two interaction effects indicated by the pattem of results m Table 6 were also reliable by traditional standards, or nearly so That is to say, observers revised their beliefs more after out-of-role than after m-role behavior {PF < 01) and this effect was particularly strong among neutral observers
{PF<
10)
Finally, out-of-role behavior led observers to want further information to a greater extent than m-role behavior {PF < 05) Moreover, under out-of-role conditions, both pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli observers expressed a stronger desire than neutral observers {PF < 05) DISCUSSION Out-of-role political statements not only were recogmzed as disloyal and nonconforming activities but they also drastically affected the observer's behef about an actor's true attitude Revisions in the estimated likelihood of a Jew being anti-Israeli and an Arab being pro-Israeli were substantial following outof-role pronouncements Moreover, the magmtude of revision vaned with the observer's OWTI attitude Unfortunately the latter effect differed markedly across experiments In the first experiment both pro-Israeh and anti-Israeli observers revised their beliefs about a Jew who made anti-Israeh comments more than neutral observers, m the second experiment neutral observers revised their beliefs about an Arab who made pro-Israeh comments more than pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli observers Moreover, this pattem of differences in the magnitude of revision corresponds exactly to the pattem of differences in credibility attnbuted to out-of-role behavior Both pro-Israeli and antiIsraeli observers judge anti-Israeh statements by a Jew to be more frank and sincere than do neutral observers, while the latter judge the pro-Israeh statements by an Arab to be more frank and sincere than do pro-Israeh and anti-Israeli observers Thus there is evidence that the impact of out-of-role behavior is mediated by its perceived credibility But nothing in the present study permits us to say why credibility varies m this fashion With observers' attitudes Thus no really straightforward interpretation can be made regarding the relationship between prior belief and the attribution process We do offer, however, the following conjecture since our observers are heavily proIsraeh, anti-Israeh statements are likely to be seen as socially undesirable acts Such behaviors are generally assumed to be more credible than those which are socially desirable (see Jones & Davis, 1965 ) Suppose in our study that (1) judgments of credibihty were based not only on whether the behavior was in-or out-of-role, but also whether it was socially desirable or undesirable, and (2) biased observers compared to neutral observers gave much greater weight to social desirabihty If this were the case, then the findings on credibihty and revision of opimon display a consistent pattem biased observers compared to neutral observers tend to see the socially undesirable anti-Israeli statements as much more credible, and thus are more likely to revise behefs in the hght of such behavior, regardless of whether the latter are m-role or out-of-role A second rather strong effect of prior beliefs is readily exphcable, being perfectly consistent with findings from other likelihood estimation studies In both expjeriments pro-Israeli observers underestimated the likelihood of out-of-role beliefs m the actor-of a Jew being anti-Israeli and an Arab being proIsraeli-compared to neutral and anti-Israeli observers The vanous theories of cogmtive consistency, especially as they bear on person perception, imply that something like overestimation should occur, to wit in the absence of other information an observer will expect a person possesses consistent attnbutes to the extent that the observer believes these attributes are important and closely related Studies in which individuals estimate the likelihood of an individual having a specific characteristic given that he has one or more related characteristics provide good support for this assertion (Bumstem, 1967 , DeSoto & Kuethe, 1959 , McNeel & Messick, 1970 . Recall that our proIsraeh observers were in both experiments much more extreme than either neutral or anti-Israeh observers Hence it is fairly reasonable to assume that a person's attitude toward Israel is a more unportant issue, and perhaps more closely related to ethmcity for him, than for these other observers If either supposition IS correct then it follows that pro-Israeh observers are more likely than others to believe that a Jew is pro-Israeh, not anti-Israeh, and an Arab is anti-Israeli, not pro-Israeh
The methodological importance of such biases m estimation of beliefs is perhaps self-evident, that is, the differential impact of m-role and out-of-role behavior cannot be assessed adequately unless prior beliefs are taken into consideration In our first experiment, for example, merely assessing post-behavior estimates of the actor's tme attitude would suggest that out-of-role behavior has less impact as observers become increasingly proIsraeh (see Table 3 , column labelled "After"), when, in fact, the relationship is curvihnear-both pro-Israeh and anti-Israeh observer revise prior beliefs more than neutrals Perhaps earlier studies of ln-role/out-of-role variables gave relatively weak results because the behef-revision aspect of attribution processes was not stressed and thus not deemed necessary to assess pnor beliefs (e g., Jones & Hams, 1967) When asked to make comparable judgments about the actor "as a person" observers generalized from their evaluations of his statements about the Arab-Israeh confhct The effect was pervasive and strong After noting he had behaved, say, in an independent fashion when responding to the mterviewer's questions about Israeh pohcies, observers judged the actor to be in general a quite independent person Nevertheless, this did not influence their judgments of his comments on the Common Market and arms limitation On the face of it the generahzation effects are a puzzle Inrole behavior was perceived as markedly different from out-ofrole behavior, and the characteristics attnbuted to these distinctive acts were generalized to the actor as personal traits, yet there was no tendency to generalize further to role-neutral behavior. It is as if observers were willing to make inferences about a relatively important matter (the actor's personality), but were loathe to make comparable inferences about relatively unimportant matters (his statements regarding the Common Market and arms hmitation) Our speculation is that these effects resulted from differences in the amoimt of information contained m the entities to be judged. Observers were told virtually nothing about the actor "as a person." The statements he made about Israel, however, had a good deal of substance in addition to saying something about demeanor under social pressure It is not surpnsmg, therefore, that these detailed assertions were useful in forming an opinion about his personahty Indeed, observers were probably obliged to generalize from the former when pressed for an opimon regarding the latter This was not the case for role-neutral opinions They, hke their role-relevant counterpart, were packed with much information, and thus observers had a good basis for evaluating them m respect to their loyalty, frankness, etc, independent of what had been said about Israel In other words, because the role-neutral statements were relatively distinct and well elaborated, they could be (and apparently were) judged m their own nght It is worth noting that under such conditions Rommetveit (1960) also observed "halo effects" to be inhibited
That attributions made following out-of-role behavior are tentative is strongly suggested by the fmdmg that following such behavior observers have a marked preference for additional information about the actor and the situation Furthermore, recall that pro-Israeli and anti-Israeh observers in the second expenment were sure, compared to a neutral observer, that the actor they were about to hear would be anti-Israeli Under outof-role conditions, after listemng to the interview they came to the conclusions that the actor was probably pro-Israeli but with much less certainty than a neutral observer It tumed out that, followmg the out-of-role performance, pro-Israeh and antiIsraeli observers also indicated a stronger desire for additional information than neutral observers In the first expenment proIsraeli observers were least certain of the actor's real behefs following out-of-role behavior and they were the ones who also tended to express the strongest need for more information It would seem then that the observer's desire for additional information depends directly on the extent to which his observations lead him to abandon a relatively certain opinion of the actor for a relatively uncertain and contrary one SuMMABY Out-of-role behavior markedly changed the observer's behef about the actor's tme attitude Revisions m the estimated likelihood of a Jew bemg anti-Israeli and an Arab bemg pro-Israeli were substantial followmg out-of-role statements. Moreover, the observer's own attitude affected the extent to which he felt the actor's behavior was credible and the extent to which he revised his behef about the actor m the hght of his behavior These effects differed in our two experiments, however, and no good explanation could be offered for the difference One consistent and strong result mvolving pnor beliefs was obtamed extremely pro-Israeli observers overestimated the likelihood of m-role attitudes (a Jew being pro-Israeli or an Arab being anti-Israeh) and underestimated the likelihood of out-ofrole attitudes (a Jew bemg anti-Israeh or an Arab bemg proIsraeh)
Observers consistently generahzed from their evaluations of the actor's role-relevant behavior to evaluations of the actor "as a person " However, there was no tendency to generalize from role-relevant to role-neutral acts Finally, observers under outof-role conditions expressed a greater desire for additional information about the actor than those under m-role conditions This desire seemed particularly marked if, after noting what the actor said, the observer was relatively uncertain about what attitude to attnbute to him
